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Abstract 
The paper discusses the concept of identity in relation to management. We take our 
starting point in Wittgenstein’s concept language games. We argue that identity is a 
question of using linguistic tools to construct reality. Two elements of the language game 
metaphor are central here: rules and family resemblance. We argue that rules and family 
resemblance are central for the construction of identity because they are the link between 
individual and social realities. We use the concept of narrating to emphasize how 
individuals construct themselves as meaningful individuals in the world. Narrating is the 
process by which individuals seek to bridge the gap between the “ought” and the “is”: a 
process of integration. It seeks to integrate past, present and future; it seeks to integrate 
logic and values; and it seeks to integrate individual and social worlds. Narrating is 
conditioned on rules and family resemblance. As such, managing identity in 
organizations is closely linked to rules and family resemblance. Organizations manage 
identity through the definition of norms and values for right or wrong, appropriate or 
inappropriate, to name but a few. Norms and values are important as reference points for 
constructing identities. Managing identity has become more important because the rules-
of-the-game have become more unstable. Managing identity is important if the bonds 
between individuals and organizations are to be sustained. But this task is contradictory 
and paradoxical of its very nature because the conditioning factors of these bonds, rules 
and family resemblances may be eroded by change. 
 
Keywords: Identity, language games, rules, family resemblance, integration, narrating, 
managing identity. 
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Identity and the Management Project  
 
“There is little reason to expect one’s loyalty to a group or an organization to 
be reciprocated. It is unwise (“irrational”) to proffer such loyalty on credit 
when it is unlikely to be repaid.” (Bauman 2004: 30).  
 
Introduction 
Construction of reality may be described as an integration of four dimensions: facts, 
logic, values and communication (Henriksen, Nørreklit, Jørgensen, Christensen and 
O’Donnell 2004; Nørreklit, Israelsen and Nørreklit 2005). Reality is our conception of 
world. Construction of reality is that which works for us (Nørreklit, Israelsen and 
Nørreklit 2005: 44-45). While the world is objective, our conception of reality is 
subjective. The world cannot be spoken of as such, as the ontological objective is merely 
an ideal concept. Physical and material elements can only be studied as and through 
human symbols, language and actions. Facts are material realities, artifacts, historical 
facts, what is said done and what has been said and done. Logic transforms facts to 
possibilities – possibilities that we choose between. Logic may be material (technologies 
and systems), formal (mathematics, science), social (routines) or subjective (individual 
routines). Values describe what is important and valuable for us. Values are what we like 
or dislike. Values give meaning to reality. They are the foundation for choice and 
assessment and thus they are our guidelines for what we want to do and how we should 
treat others. As with logic, values are learned and interiorized through our upbringing and 
experiences in society and organizations. Facts, logic and values are integrated into the 
fourth dimension, communication. Communication is the medium through which reality 
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becomes socially constructed. It would not be possible to talk about culture, community, 
society or history without communication (Dewey 1916). Communication is thus the 
condition for talking about reality as socially constructed. Communication is a question 
of life and death for the organization (Gergen, Gergen and Barrett: 2004). Facts, logic 
and values are integrated in the way that we talk and act. They are integrated in our 
language and language games (Wittgenstein 1983). The central idea here is that language 
should not be understood as a mirror of reality. Instead language is a toolbox for the 
construction of reality (Wittgenstein 1983: §§ 11-12). The meaning of words, concepts 
and sentences cannot be defined once and for all. Instead they get their meaning through 
the way they are used in everyday life. The use of language is regulated by rules such as 
norms, traditions, conventions and so on. These rules are tacit and taken-for-granted 
(Clegg 1975; Hardy and Clegg 1996; Jørgensen 2006). However, it is these rules that 
make is possible to communicate with others – to participate in language games – 
because rules mean that individuals’ language or repertoires becomes shared (Wenger 
1998). Since we construct reality by playing language games, we also construct our 
identity through language and language games. We may call our words and concepts in 
the linguistic toolbox for the technologies of the self (Foucault 1988). As such it is 
impossible to understand identity without understanding society and culture. It is from 
this understanding that we will discuss identity in this paper. 
 
Facts, logic and values are integrated in our language and language games. This also 
suggests that these are created by our language and language games. The integration of 
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these three dimensions in language is central in understanding what identity is. Bauman 
(2004) suggests the following: 
 
“The idea of “identity” was born out of a crisis of belonging and out of the 
effort it triggered to bridge the gap between the “ought” and the “is” and to 
lift reality to the standards set by the idea – to remake reality in the likeness 
of the idea.” (Bauman 2004: 20).  
 
According to Bauman, identity is an integration of ”is” and “ought”. The idea is thus that 
identity creates consistency and coherence between past, present and future (Harré and 
Gillett 1994) – a continuity in the way that we live our lives and the purpose of living our 
lives. Thus identity has a double character. On the one hand it is a question of being a 
particular person. On the other hand it concerns a continuous struggle towards becoming 
a particular person. Identity can be spoken of as an ideal model, as a goal if you will, but 
it can also be seen as a process of creating this goal. Values are thus integrated in the way 
we create new possibilities in the world by participating in language games. The 
integration of “is” and “ought” is thus the integration of logic and values and at the same 
time it is an integration of past, present and future. This integration is normally tacit in 
our daily participation in language games. As such identity is tacit and taken-for-granted. 
We do not usually reflect too much about who we are. In everyday situations identity 
works tacitly in merging the individual and the social (see next section). When this 
merger is relatively unproblematic it is a sign that our language works. When our 
language does not work, it is an indication that the individual and the social begin to fall 
apart. An example in organizations is when individuals begin to work independently of 
the organization, even though they are formal organizational members. In such situations 
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the bonds between the individual and the organization are torn apart. It may happen in 
periods of rapid change; technological, social, economic or others. Or it may happen as a 
consequence of internal organizational changes; managerial, structural, cultural or others. 
Or, of course, it may happen due to some combination of these factors. It is perhaps 
because present day organizational life is characterized by relatively rapid changes that 
the contemporary interest in identity has emerged in sociology (Giddens 1991; Bauman 
2004), in educational research (Lave and Wenger 1991; Wenger 1998; Chappell, Rhodes, 
Solomon, Tennant and Yates 2003; Sfard and Prusak 2005) and in organizational 
research (Czarniawska 1997; Boje 2001; Ainsworth and Hardy 2004). ”You tend to 
notice things and put them into the focus of your scrutiny and contemplation only when 
they vanish, go bust, start to behave oddly or otherwise let you down” (Bauman 2004: 
17).  
 
In any case there is a renewed interest in, and need for, understanding identity in relation 
to management. This paper seeks to contribute to such an understanding. We suggest 
using the concept language games to understand identity. More specifically we use two 
elements of the language game metaphor to aid such understanding: family resemblance 
and rules. Rules and family resemblance are important because they constitute the link 
between individual and social realities on which the bonds between the individual and the 
social must be created. These bonds include such things as trust, mutuality, expectations, 
obligations and aspirations. We use the concept narrating to characterize a specific 
aspect of language games - individuals’ continuous efforts to bridge the gap between the 
“is” and the “ought”. In other words narrating integrates who we want to become and 
 6
who we are. These efforts are expressed as identifications with, and subjugations to, talk, 
actions and attitudes of particular persons, groups, professions, organizations, institutions 
or societies. Narrating integrates different dimensions of reality. On one hand, it 
comprises our hopes, dreams, role models and so on. On the other hand, it also comprises 
how one legitimizes what one says and does. We deal with the question of managing 
identity in the final section of the paper. We argue that management of identities is 
actually about communicating the “ought” embedded and embodied in the norms and 
rules of the organization’s language games. Rules are important in managing identity; so 
is power. We argue that present day organizational life has created a greater emphasis on 
managing identity because the rules of the game are increasingly subjected to continuous 
change. When the rules change, the bonds between individuals and organizations are also 
put in jeopardy. This means that managing identity has emerged as perhaps one of the 
most important but also contradictory and paradoxical managerial challenges. 
 
Identity as Language Game 
Identity is an integration of ”is” and ”ought”, an integration of past, present and future, 
and an integration of individual and social realities. As noted above, we suggest that this 
integration is accomplished by playing language games (Wittgenstein 1983), where 
language and the ways in which language are used constitute the toolbox – our 
technologies of the self – for constructing identity. In this way identity becomes a 
question of using linguistic tools such as concepts, methods, statements, symbols, myths, 
sagas, stories and narratives to construct reality. Language is the toolbox and the point of 
reference in identity creation. It follows that the source of identity lies in culture and in 
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shared cultural symbols and resources (Geertz 1973; Bruner 1996). Identity is 
conditioned on the ability to use language – in other words to be able to participate in 
language games. We deal here with two concepts linked to the concept of language 
games. The first concept is family resemblance, which simultaneously is a projection 
from the body towards external objects and thus a condition for being able to play 
language games in the first place. The second concept is rules, which deal with how 
using language presupposes recognizing and learning the language game rules, which 
over time become tacit and taken for granted. In the process of assimilating the rules-of-
the-game identity is conditioned and regulated by social norms, conventions and 
traditions making up organizations, cultures and societies. Clearly, family resemblance 
and rules also condition each other, as the latter can only be understood through and as 
the former. Family resemblance is, for example, at one and the same time a consequence 
of the rules of language and a condition for using language in a particular situation.  
 
Family resemblance 
Family resemblance denotes the solution that Wittgenstein offers in the face of the fact 
that he cannot find any common characteristic that defines a language as a language, a 
game as a game and so on. Instead, there are networks of similarities that overlap and 
criss-cross each other. Language is not called language because of one common 
characteristic. Languages look alike in the same sense as brothers and sisters look alike 
—“…build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross 
in the same way. – And I shall say: ‘games’ form a family” (Wittgenstein 1983: § 67). 
Thus the phenomena called language is not called language simply because they share 
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one common characteristic that unites them. They are called language because they look 
like each other just as brothers and sisters look alike in terms of looks, temperament and 
so on. Yet, they are different from each other. This network of similarities is crucial both 
in terms of understanding how individuals recognize unique events as similar to others. A 
crucial part of these similarities is the rules for using language, which means that 
similarity to other situations is just as much something that is constructed as it is 
something that is experienced. Identification relies on family resemblance experienced by 
individuals. Identification cannot be accomplished without experiencing that situations 
are similar to what individuals have learned and seen before. As such, identification is a 
result of what the individual has done and experienced before in similar - but not 
analytically identical - situations. Identification is not analogous but metaphoric in 
character. It is not mathematical but to some extent imprecise and vague, yet precise 
enough for human understanding and cooperation. In dealing with everyday situations, 
individuals draw from how they have learned to use language in similar situations – 
thereby constructing reality. They use the past to construct the present – and indeed they 
often use the past to give new content to the present. Through family resemblance, 
situations are made relatively similar and thus predictable. If situations are not 
predictable, it is impossible to make sense of reality. It would also be impossible to 
coordinate social actions because they rely on predictability (Weick 1979: 100).  
 
It is important to realize that family resemblance is not only a question of recognizing 
specific situations as similar to others. Identification should not be misunderstood as a 
passive automated response to whatever comes up. It is an active and often quite 
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reflective process whereby individuals use language to position themselves in the 
language game. As such family resemblance is a construction. It is a projection from the 
individual to the external world. Identification becomes an undertaking of imposing 
familiar structures and coherence onto new situations. Identification is thus a way of 
establishing truth in reality by using language. “Metaphorically speaking, identifying is 
an attempt to overcome the fluidity of change by collapsing a video clip into a snapshot” 
(Sfard and Prusak 2005: 16). “When people punctuate their own living into stories, they 
impose a formal coherence on what is otherwise a flowing soup” (Weick 1995: 128; see 
also Boje 2001: 2). Identification is thus essential for our very existence. Identification is 
a way of making reality manageable through an active process of construction, whereby 
meaning is projected from the body to the world. Polanyi (1958, 1966) introduces the 
ideas of a tacit dimension in every kind of talk and action. Implicit in this idea is the 
conception that knowledge is basically characterized by from-to movements. Our 
knowledge moves from the body to its meaning in a way where the meaning is projected 
away from us. These internal processes are incredibly complex and characterized by the 
fact that they are difficult to control and even feel or experience. But the ability to 
integrate and to shape elements in from-to movements is none-the-less learned through a 
process which can be quite strenuous (Polanyi, 1966: 14-15). Reality is thus a projection 
where the projection is the result of a learning process. But it is a process that moves 
from the body to external objects.  
 
”Our body is the ultimate instrument of all our external knowledge, whether 
intellectual or practical. In all our waking moments we are relying on our 
awareness of contacts of our body with things outside for attending to these 
things. Our own body is the only thing in the world which we normally never 
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experience as an object, but experience always in terms of the world to which we 
are attending from our body. It is by making this intelligent use of our body that 
we feel it to be our body, and not a thing outside.” (Polanyi 1966: 15-16) 
 
Knowledge goes from the body to the world and we depend on the body in our actions 
and understandings. We know the body from what it does in the world. Hall describes it 
as follows: ”Insofar as I act, I am not conscious of myself but from myself” (Hall 1979: 
276). Polanyi uses the concept “indwelling” in this connection (Polanyi 1966: 16) to 
denote how we use our body to capture the meaning of external objects. Hall also uses 
the description ”participating in” to denote the active process by which we create reality. 
”On this epistemology, I am not a detached, impersonal observer in knowing, but on the 
contrary, I pour myself into things.” (Hall 1979: 275). As such the borderlines between 
the knower and the known are dissolved. It is the knower, who gives the world meaning 
and character. What is known is not known on its own conditions, but is known on the 
knower’s conditions. In other words a merger occurs between the individual and the 
world, so that they are not anymore two different things. We recognize ourselves from 
what we see, hear, feel and do in interaction with other people in time and space. We do 
not recognize ourselves by focusing upon who we are but by talking and acting in the 
world. As such identification is always experienced by someone in a specific context, 
which means that any concept of truth is inseparable from subjective mind. It takes a 
human being to conceptualize truth and create identity as the external can only be 
experienced internally (Blumer 1969). Going against Cartesian dualism, we argue that the 
individual is her external world. There is no way to establish subject or object as 
ontologically apart from each other. This merger is normally not something that we 
reflect upon. It is tacit and taken-for-granted. Therefore we do not normally reflect upon 
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who we are. Normally, we take our identity for granted (Bauman 2004). But this taken-
for-grantedness relies on the fact that the world also behaves in familiar ways when we 
act in it. Otherwise identity is lost and becomes a sign that our language does not work in 
this context and therefore that we do not have any position in it – except of course the 
position of an outsider. Identity is conditioned on family resemblance. If the world 
suddenly began to behave in unfamiliar ways, we would not know what to do in it.  
 
Rules 
The other central concept in Wittgenstein’s philosophy in relation to an understanding of 
identity is the concept of rules – a concept also linked closely to family resemblance. 
Identification relies on the fact that language is rule-governed. Rule-governed suggests 
that even if it is impossible to specify what words means, and thus that words may have 
countless different uses, this in no way indicates any relativistic understanding of reality. 
The language game metaphor calls attention to the fact that social situations are regulated 
by rules-of-the-game (Hardy and Clegg 1996; Clegg 1975) that govern talk and actions. 
The rules are thus not deterministic in the sense that people have to talk and act in 
particular ways. People can choose to say and do whatever they say and do. The 
important point is that these statements and actions may not count as knowledge in the 
social situation in which they take place (Haugaard 1997: 56). Being brought up in 
particular cultures we have learned to speak and act in a particular manner. But these 
rules are usually implicit, tacit and interiorized in the very way that we live our lives. In 
everyday conversations and actions we don’t usually have to specify how we know the 
meaning of words and concepts and we don’t usually have to specify how we know how 
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to walk for example. We simply walk and talk. Even if these examples on simple 
everyday situations, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to specify exactly how we 
know these things. Yet, we do know; and further we are even capable of using words to 
communicate and accomplish things with other people even if we are not capable of 
specifying precisely the rules of the game. Words are perfectly applicable anyhow. If, 
asks Wittgenstein, “I tell someone “stand roughly there” – may not this information work 
perfectly” (Wittgenstein, 1983, §88). The answer is that of course it may work perfectly. 
The important question is not whether the information is precise or imprecise but whether 
the information is understood or misunderstood. The usability of language does not 
require that the meaning of language must be defined once and for all. But it requires that 
situations are similar to other situations and that symbols from the past are made 
significant in the present; that they are contextualized and given particular meanings.  
 
Identification is about construction. We are able to recognize social patterns because we 
actively construct these patterns ourselves based upon what we have learned from our 
social surroundings. As children we learn very quickly that the social world is comprised 
of specific rules of conduct. We learn about specific instruments of communication; that 
some things can and should be used if we are to be allowed to participate. We learn how 
to use language to accomplish particular things. The ability to learn about the social 
world is not something we ask for as much as it is cast upon us. In a way we are forced 
by our own bodily capabilities to learn to use language and we cannot help but go with 
this flow in one way or another if we are to create identity. It is an inevitable part of 
growing up and being socialized. With regard to society as a whole, we must come to 
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terms with its many games if we want to play a role in it. And to understand and play a 
game one must master its instruments. “To understand a language means to be master of 
a technique” (Wittgenstein, 1983, § 199). On a generic level such tools are what are 
commonly labelled linguistic or significant symbols. This implies that they carry more or 
less the same meaning for all those involved in a game (see also Mead 1934). Learning 
and using linguistic symbols is then not an arbitrary exercise. To use Heidegger’s terms 
(Nicolaisen 2003) it is a process of meticulously building up a fore-having in accordance 
with experienced social structures, which subsequently is used as a tool to create identity 
in the social world. To grasp the logic of a language game means to enrol its rules in 
one’s fore-having so as to continually apply them (creatively) to new situations; to 
reconstruct them in-context for the purpose of creating identity. Hence, identification can 
be seen as the rational and contextual application of (or play with) linguistic rules in 
order to maintain coherence in a spontaneously lived moment. For a hammer to be a 
hammer, it must be used and understood as such over time. As for any symbol it must be 
logically applied in a systematic manner in specific contexts. Using a hammer correctly 
means playing a language game the way it is intended; the way it is interpreted 
intersubjectively across time and space (Okrent: 1988). Like a carpenter must know how 
to use a hammer, other occupational groups, such as physicians, teachers and managers 
must master a range of professional techniques and rules of conduct unique to their 
everyday contexts. As all language games are different, they require a range of different 
theoretical insights, bodily skills and practical know-how. Any sign can be used in a 
language game to produce meaning. Odours, sounds, physical objects or shapes, or 
abstract signs such as musical notes, words and rules of conduct are all linguistic tools. 
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What they have in common is that more than one individual can agree upon their 
meaning, as they reside as somewhat identical potentials of meaning for all involved. 
Creating identity must involve using such tools, to retrieve them from the depths of 
memory and re-create them in situ. And only if linguistic tools are used in accordance 
with established norms do they provide intersubjective sense. As such they work as tools 
or recipes providing sufficiently predictable and meaningful ways of interaction. The 
abstract rules underpinning a game reach from the past into the present as action. That the 
language game is continued from situation to another, however, does not mean that it is 
exactly replicated, for as human action it is inevitably imprecise, which in technical terms 
implicates some amount of change. Change, however, is perhaps a poor choice of word 
here, because it implies that there exists something to be changed to begin with - in this 
case the rules of language games. But as these can never be singled out as such there 
cannot be any real change in the ontological objective sense. We are thus able to collapse 
a 2500 year old debate initiated by the philosophers Parmenides and Heraclites as 
identification is recognized as something living and to some extent imprecise. Or, indeed, 
in Heidegger’s terms: identity only exists in the moment of its making, and immediately 
(if learned) it turns into fore-having, from where it potentially shapes further 
identification. To identify (with) something is to understand it as similar to what is 
already in the fore-having; to construct a coherent world.  
 
Language game and narrative 
To summarize, identity is a question of playing language games by using language 
according to traditions, uses, conventions – in short the rules - of a particular culture, thus 
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identifying and recreating family resemblances. Identity is internalized ways of talking 
and acting and it is shaped from playing language games in particular social and cultural 
surroundings according to the rules of these surroundings. Identity is a historical 
construction shaped by individual life paths. As such identity is first of all complex, 
paradoxical, pluralistic, fragmented, and intersected by many different and contradictory 
forces (Foucault 1978, 1979, 1984). So the toolbox for the construction and 
reconstruction of identities derives from language and the way it is used. Identity is 
highly implicit and conditioned on language rules and the capacity to employ family 
resemblance.  
 
We try to relate this conception to another idea about identity construction that has 
attracted great attention over the past decade - the idea that we narrate our identities 
(Boje 2001; Czarniawska 1997; Chappell, Rhodes, Solomon, Tennant and Yates 2003; 
Sfard and Prusak 2005). Narrating is about giving sense and coherence to what we do 
(Boje 2001: 2). To narrate is to try to bridge the gap between the “ought” and the “is”; it 
is a process in which individuals seek to integrate facts, logic and values as well as 
individual and social worlds, past, present and future (Henriksen, Nørreklit, Jørgensen, 
Christensen and O’Donnell 2004: 40-44). Narrating is thus a description of how we seek 
to construct ourselves in relation to the situations in which we are players. We believe 
that it is a mistake to suggest that identities are “… collections of stories about persons, 
or more specifically, as those narratives about individuals that are reifying, endorsable 
and significant” (Sfard and Prusak 2005: 16). The focus here is almost unambiguously 
moved away from the ways that people talk and act to the stories available in the social 
 16
space. It is more appropriate to say that individuals construct realities by using the 
narrative resources available in the language games. By the term narrative resources we 
retrieve language as a toolbox where narrating is the active process by which identity is 
created from the toolbox. Narrating is in other words game-playing. Secondly Sfard and 
Prusak’s definition of identity seems to build on a rather high level of consciousness 
about identity: “…a story about a person counts as endorsable if the identity-builder, 
when asked, would say that it faithfully reflects the state of affairs in the world” (Sfard 
and Prusak 2005: 16). This is problematic for the simple reason that identity is highly 
implicit and tacit as we have noted above. Finally, we believe that Sfard and Prusak’s 
definition emphasizes too much the narrative as such, where identity is rather expressed 
in narrating, where narrating is characterized as a continuous effort to bridge the gap 
between the “is” and the “ought” and where this effort seeks to create unity and 
consistency from material that is complex, pluralistic and fragmented - that which is ante-
narrative (Boje 2001: 1): “Antenarrative is the fragmented, non-linear, incoherent, 
collective, unplotted and prenarrative speculation, a bet”. Narrating seeks to create 
consistency in these different forces, but therefore there will always be differences 
between who we are and narrating. Genealogical analysis (Foucault 1984; Nietzsche 
1992; Haugaard 1997; Flyvbjerg 2001; Jørgensen 2002, 2006) takes this as its primary 
starting point in that– by means of history – it seeks to demonstrate the difference 
between who we are and the stories and narratives we tell about who we are. Concepts 
like self-narration (Giddens 1991) or reflective identity (Chappell et al. 2003) need to be 
interpreted in this way, and it plays an important part of the creation of identity. Narrative 
is a model of who we are and what we want to pursue. It is an ought rather than an is. It is 
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constructed through narrative resources or what is also referred to as identity capital 
(Pullen 2005), which is present in our language games and their surrounding cultures 
(Bruner 1996: 3). We call it narrative resources to emphasize the fundamentally 
incomplete, fragmented and inconsistent in these narrative resources. It is individuals that 
create consistency through a tacit but rule-governed process. 
 
Narrating is important as an integration of “is” and “ought”. In narrating we create a 
meaningful reality for ourselves in the world and thus connect with the social world. 
Further, narrating seeks to construct a desirable future. Narrating thus has two purposes. 
Firstly, it expresses our goals and aims in life. Narrating is to let our talk and actions 
point in a desired direction. It contains our hopes and dreams, our role models and 
desired futures. It gives sense and direction. Secondly, narrating also expresses the 
legitimacy of what we say and do. Our narratives are what we show to the world. It is a 
mask (Pullen 2005) – a mask that is sometimes fragile, incidental and superficial, 
adaptable to any situation and purpose. Thus on one hand, our narratives contain our 
hopes and dreams. But we also hide in our stories and narratives. Narrative as goal and 
legitimization are two sides of the same coin. Both are expressions that in everyday life 
an implicit identification is going on to the talk, actions, opinions and viewpoints of 
particular people, groups, organizations, institutions, or professions. This prevails no 
matter whether talk and actions are ironic, sarcastic or humoristic; or if talk and actions 
have a particular function in that they often rebuff rationalization initiatives and demands 
for effectiveness by giving them a human face (Gabriel 2000; Pritchard, Jones and 
Stablein 2004). Narrating and narrative thus express an important aspect of identity in 
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that they express the “ought”. At the same time, however identity is something more. It 
comprises both the “is” and the “ought”, where “is” in reality is a lot more complex, 
contradictory and fragmented than suggested by narrating. The “ought” is something that 
is produced by every society, every organization and every group as part of their own 
image and their own conception of who they are. 
 
 But there is a more varied story behind every conception of how people think about 
themselves. There is a darker side, something that people do not express in their language 
about themselves. Sometimes this side is uglier, more unpleasant and more embarrassing 
but it is nonetheless a part of who people are. As such narrating and narratives always 
have an aspect of cover-up for reality at the same time as it communicates reality. Thus 
language and communication are both used to construct reality but also to disguise 
reality. Even so one should be careful how this masquerade is uncovered – sometimes 
one should not uncover at all. Narrating and narrative mean something for people. In the 
end, they express foundations of life that people stick to and sometimes hang onto. In this 
way, genealogical analysis is, for example, ethically problematic, because it seeks to 
reveal the difference between the “is” and the “ought”: between the conceptions of who 
we are expressed in narrating and narrative and what we have factually said and done 
before. Besides, a difference is necessary, because otherwise our lives would contain no 
desirable opportunities or futures. On the other hand, the difference may become so big, 
that in reality the “ought” becomes an illusion where there is no continuity between past, 
present and future. In these cases “Ought” is an empty façade. There are people, who 
believe that this problem is among the most pressing in western societies (Bauman 2004). 
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And it is perhaps one of the reasons why we discuss the problem of managing identity. 
The problem is related to the global conditions of existence of present day organizations 
characterized by great technological, political, economic and social changes, where the 
conditioning of identity creation, rules and family resemblance, become more unstable 
and in some instances a lot more unstable. 
 
Managing identities 
The problems noted above provide an understanding of what managing identity is all 
about. We have demonstrated how our values are integrated in the way we speak and act. 
Integrated in language games are ideas, what is right and what is wrong, appropriate and 
inappropriate etc. Integrated in language games within organizations are norms and 
standards – that is rules - for talking and acting. These rules are guidelines for individuals 
when they construct their identity in the organization. They constitute the criteria for 
competence and incompetence: what it is one should strive for when one wants to 
become a member of the group, the organization or the community. Through its language 
games the organization communicates certain values that promote and hamper particular 
forms of talk and action. These values are expressed in stories, in organizational role 
models, in punishment and rewards, distribution of resources, organization of career 
patterns, distribution of authority etc. The organization’s norms and standards are thus 
central to the management of identity. Rules and family resemblance are a condition for 
the construction of identity. It follows that power becomes closely linked to identity 
because organizing is a question of defining the rules for correct and incorrect behavior. 
Here we define who is inside and who is outside. Power is within the language game and 
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is located in ways of speaking, thinking, acting and being (Hardy and Clegg 1996: 631; 
Jørgensen 2004). Hence, the rules of language games within organizations are practices 
of surveillance (Hardy and Clegg 1996; Clegg 1989) in the sense that these rules govern 
talk and actions towards conformity and normalization. These rules are, as noted above, 
tacit and taken-for-granted but they regulate and modify ways of talking, acting, thinking 
and being; they are the criteria for judging what counts as knowledge and learning 
(Haugaard 1997: 56-57). As such the basic idea of surveillance is that actors represent 
different institutions and are required to speak and act in a particular manner. They do so 
as responsible actors and as actors located in specific social positions. Part of power 
analysis thus focuses on the scope for the construction of identity which is embedded and 
embodied in the organization’s language games. This is especially the case for writers, 
who are concerned with power in relation to organizational discourse, which “…focuses 
on the way in which broader discourses are used to construct subject positions that both 
enable and limit a range of social practices” (Ainsworth and Hardy 2004: 164). In this 
case the focus of power is on “…discursive formations, as bodies of knowledge that 
”systematically form the object of which they speak” (Hardy and Philips 2004: 301). It is 
a one-sided way of speaking about the construction of identity, where there is not much 
room for the individual. However, it has its strength in the ways in which it links identity 
with norms and standards – and thus the values - embedded and embodied in the 
language games. History has demonstrated that these norms and standards are very 
pervasive and have the power of making people do almost anything as part of the sense of 
obligation and responsibility to the community in which they belong. This includes 
participating in systematic, meticulous and “rational” planning and implementation of 
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mass murder such as Holocaust (Bauman 1989). The “crime” committed was “just” to 
live out the values of a society where the problem in judging these criminals in the 
Holocaust case lies in the fact that the right to judge relies on saying that people should 
be able to distinguish right from wrong even when right was contrary to the perception of 
the whole society (Bauman 1989: 273-274). Identity and society are closely interveawed. 
Individuals construct their identities in relation to the rules and norms of society and 
organizations. Without these stabilizing structures, it would be much more difficult to act 
because there would be no family resemblance. In circumstances where the rules are too 
unstable, the bonds between individuals and organizations are lost and jumbled. Trust, 
mutuality, loyalty, obedience, but also ambitions and aspirations are based on the fact that 
the rules-of-the-game are relatively stable and that reality behaves in relatively familiar 
ways. Otherwise there would be nothing to stick to when constructing identities.  
 
As mentioned above, this is perhaps why we are interested in managing identity. We are 
interested in identity because our sense of belonging has begun to vanish or behave oddly 
and threatens to let us down (Bauman 2004: 17). “Managing identity” has thus emerged 
as an important challenge in management because there are more and more aspects of 
organizations that can no longer be taken for granted. This includes the notion of 
organization itself as a stable structure clearly demarcated from its environment. This is 
an effect of globalization, technological, political and economic changes, which have led 
to the demise of stable institutions such as society, nation state and organization. The 
challenge for the organization in this context may be characterized as a quest for 
narratives that may hold the organization together. But this problem is not only relevant 
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here and now; it is a problem that probably will continue to be salient because of 
continuous changes - changes that may in fact erode and hollow out these narratives 
before they have had a chance to have an impact. For the individual employees the 
challenge may also be described as a quest for narrating. The narrative challenge here is 
to construct a sense of self, a coherent “I” that desperately seeks a “We” in the context of 
an ever shifting, dynamic and fragmentary form of life imposed by constant changes that 
threaten to collapse and corrode character (Sennett 1998). Both processes are symptoms 
of the same phenomenon; a rather severe loosening of the bonds between the 
organization and the individual where the bonds are not strong enough to withstand the 
constant pressure of change. In such circumstances the relations between what is done 
and its consequences are no longer clear. This is one effect of the global world creating a 
greater distance, and often an arbitrary one, between decision making and its local 
effects.. People are influenced by decisions and events that may take place thousands of 
miles away under conditions not easily decoded by the people affected by them. Thus the 
criteria and circumstances of these decisions are far less transient. In such circumstances, 
it does not provide much meaning to simply view identity from, for example, a 
community of practice point of view (Lave and Wenger 1991; Wenger 1998) because the 
mechanisms of mutual engagement and alignment are not sustainable enough to create 
what we usually think of as a community. What is left for identity work is imagination: 
that is an imagined belonging to a group, a profession or an idea but increasingly without 
the amplification of actual interactions with the people with whom one identifies. It is 
especially in these circumstances that managing identity becomes extremely important in 
organization. But it is a task that is difficult, contradictory and paradoxical by its very 
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nature because the conditioning factors of these bonds, rules and family resemblance, 
may be eroded by change. In such organizations the demands for communication are very 
high because it must seek to maintain and create consistency between individual life 
paths and organizational life paths. Otherwise there is a risk that the individual and the 
organization fall apart in the sense that concepts like culture, community and solidarity 
become superficial. Instead we will have a world where individuals will experience a 
more or less permanent questioning of the self because there are no stable reference 
points for the construction of identity. And this is a world where individuals continuously 
have to struggle for themselves in a continuous search for appreciation and legitimacy, 
with the latter never being automatically accounted for. 
 
Conclusions 
Identity is a question of using linguistic tools to construct reality. Construction of identity 
is conditioned on rules and family resemblance embedded in our language games. By 
means of language we pour ourselves into the world and gain a position in this world. As 
such language and language games are the tools by which individual and social worlds 
are integrated. Narrating is the way in which individuals construct themselves as 
meaningful individuals in language games. Narrating is the process by which individuals 
seek to bridge the gap between the “ought” and the “is”. Narrating denotes a process of 
integration. It seeks to integrate past, present and future; it seeks to integrate logic and 
values; and it seeks to integrate individual and social worlds. But narrating is also 
conditioned on rules and family resemblance because they provide individuals with stable 
reference points for the construction of identity. Trust, mutuality, loyalty, obedience, 
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respect, ambitions and aspirations would disappear without rules and family resemblance 
- bonds between individuals and organizations would be lost. Organizations manage 
identity through the definition of norms and values for right or wrong, appropriate or 
inappropriate and so on. By such a process they define the rules-of-the-game and they 
seek to create family resemblance. As such, norms and values are important as reference 
points for constructing identities. There is, however, a tendency that the rules-of-the-
game have become more unstable. Managing identity thus becomes more important if the 
bonds between individuals and organizations are to be sustained. But this task is 
contradictory and paradoxical by its very nature because the conditioning factors of these 
bonds, rules and family resemblance may be eroded by change. 
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